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Abstract
Staff behaviour plays a key role in the cybersecurity position of an organisation. Despite this, behaviour-change
interventions are not commonly applied within the field of cybersecurity. Behaviour change technique could be
particularly beneficial given increasing concerns around healthcare cybersecurity risks; particularly following the
2017 WannaCry ransomware attack which had devastating results on healthcare services. Cyber-risk is particularly
concerning within healthcare given the criticality of medical systems and the potential impacts of a cyberbreach or
attack. In worst case scenarios, cybersecurity incidents could result in patient harm or even fatalities. Whilst there
has been concerted investment in improving healthcare’s technological defences against cyberthreat, the same level
of investment has not been made in healthcare staff. This has left staff behaviour as a vulnerability which can be
exploited by attackers. This paper introduces a structured approach to help organisations work through four key
steps that we refer to as the AIDE approach to Assess, Identify, Develop and Evaluate behaviour change techniques
to facilitate more secure behaviour. We include a worked example of how we are applying this approach to the
development of interventions to mitigate insecure cybersecurity behaviours in a healthcare context.
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1. Introduction
Cybersecurity in healthcare (HC) traditionally lags behind other fields (Coventry & Branley, 2018) despite
increasing concerns around cyberattacks and breaches (Albert, 2019). The WannaCry attack in 2017 is a widely
recognised example of the potential consequences of cyberattacks on the HC sector (Scott & Wingfield, 2017).
WannaCry was a ransomware attack which affected over >100 countries. Within England, the attack resulted in the
cancellation of over 19,000 patient appointments and a substantial financial cost to the National Health Service
(National Audit Office, 2018). In addition to financial cost and loss of trust in the service, breaches have the
potential to endanger human life (Kam, 2015).
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Healthcare poses an attractive target for cybercrime due to the aforementioned weak security defences and the
value of HC data (Coventry & Branley, 2018). On the black-market, HC data is currently more valuable than credit
card details (Sulleyman, 2017). Healthcare also typically involves a wide network of interconnected devices,
systems and databases.
Electronic sending of data between remote workers and other organisations provides even greater vulnerability
(Coventry & Branley, 2018; Shenoy & Appel, 2017).
Staff behaviour has been identified as one of the major contributors to cybersecurity vulnerability (Hedström,
Karlsson, & Kolkowska, 2013). However, it is important to recognise that staff – when acting securely - can also be
one of the strongest protections against cyberthreat. Unfortunately, compared to investment in technological
protection (e.g., firewalls, antivirus), investment in the human elements of cybersecurity pales in comparison
(Coventry & Branley, 2018). Investment is generally restricted to awareness training, which on its own, does not
facilitate behaviour change. Other interventions are required to provide staff with the tools and environment to act
more securely. The improvement of HC security depends upon effective behaviour change (Michie, Atkins, &
West, 2014).
The HC working environment has many characteristics that make behaviour change problematic. Staff are patient-
focused, time-pressured, fatigued and stressed (Coventry et al., 2020; Coventry & Branley, 2018; Hall et al., 2017;
Hall, Johnson, Watt, Tsipa, & O’Connor, 2016). Work culture can lead to security being overlooked or perceived as
a burden, particularly if it is perceived to detract from patient care. The working environment is also prone to
regular changes to team structure through rotation of staff members and new intakes of students. With this in mind,
we suggest a holistic and dynamic methodological approach to behaviour change. The approach builds upon
current theory and existing knowledge, whilst having the ability to evolve to reflect changes in the working
environment.
1.1 Behaviour Change
There are many theories which identify factors underlying human behaviour, some of the most widely applied are
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB: Ajzen, 1985, 1991) which emphasises the role of attitudes, social norms
and perceived control; The Integrated Behaviour Model (IBM: Fishbein, 2008) that expands upon the TPB by
including knowledge and skills to perform the behaviour, salience of the behaviour, environmental constraints, and
habit; and The Health Belief Model (Akey, Rintamaki, & Kane, 2013; Rosenstock, 1974, 1990) and Protection
Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975) that focus on perceived threats and effectiveness of coping behaviour. These
theories can guide the development of behaviour change interventions. Such interventions are made up of
‘observable and replicable components’ referred to as Behaviour Change Techniques (BCTs; Michie & Johnston,
2012). BCTs have been successfully applied across a range of domains including health (Turton, Bruidegom, Cardi,
Hirsch, & Treasure, 2015) insurance adoption (van Winssen, van Kleef, & van de Ven, 2016) and promotion of
environmentally green behaviours (Timlett & Williams, 2008). Despite success in other domains, BCTs have not
been widely applied within cybersecurity (see Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012), and particularly not in the HC context.
There is no single intervention that will work across all situations; effective change may require multiple levels and
types of interventions. Many different BCTs exist – e.g., the Behaviour Change Technique Taxonomy project has
identified 93 distinct BCTs (Michie et al., 2013). Due to this complexity, there have been many been numerous
attempts to provide simpler frameworks to provide guidance. One widely applied approach is the MINDSPACE
approach proposed by the UK’s Institute of Government (Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King, & Vlaev, 2010) which
draws upon psychological theories, behavioural economics and ‘nudge theory’. Nudging is the process of
influencing decision making, and subsequent behaviour, by altering choice architecture or framing (Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008). MINDSPACE consists of 9 components, these are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1. MINDSPACE (Dolan et al., 2010)
Component Description
Messenger We are heavily influenced by who communicates information to us. E.g.,
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authority of the messenger can influence compliance or trust.
Incentives
We are often motivated by incentives (i.e., perceived rewards). We also tend
to be influenced by predictable mental shortcuts (or ‘heuristics’) such as
being loss-averse, i.e., having a strong instinct to avoid losses. Therefore
framing incentives as loses rather than gains, can potentially have a stronger
effect.
Norms We are strongly influenced by what others do, or what we perceive them todo. Often we may not be aware that we are being influenced by others.
Defaults We will often ‘go with the flow’ or pre-set or offered options, i.e., we willoften stick with the default option if one is provided.
Salience We are more likely to pay attention to something new, easy to understandand relevant to us.
Priming Our behaviour can be influenced by sub-conscious cues.
Affect Our emotions shape our decisions, therefore our emotional response tosomething can shape our actions.
Commitment
We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and reciprocate acts.
E.g., if we have made a public commitment – such as an oral or written
announcement - that we will do something, we are more likely to do so.
Ego We prefer to act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves.
Frameworks such as MINDSPACE can help when co-designing interventions with end-users, as they provide a
concise framework that does not require extensive exploration of the underlying theory; particularly beneficial
when end-user time is of limited resource, as is typical in HC. MINDSPACE was subsequently supplemented with
EAST (Service et al., 2015) which explores more of the issues with implementation and evaluation of interventions
and identifies that successful interventions need to be easy, social, attractive and timely.
It is widely recognised in HC that behaviour change is not easy. One belief is that often interventions are too far
removed from the context in which they will be implemented, and from potential barriers to successful
implementation (Kelly & Barker, 2016). To address this, we will utilise Normalisation Process Theory (NPT; May
& Finch, 2009) which identifies factors that promote and inhibit routine uptake of complex interventions into
everyday HC practice. This is an action theory, concentrating on explaining what people do, rather than what they
believe; and recognises the need to ensure that interventions need to be compatible with current clinical practice.
NPT stresses the importance of distinguishing how the intervention differs from current processes, how end-users
can collectively agree on the purpose of an intervention (and understand what is required of them) and their
perceptions of the potential value of the intervention.
2. The AIDE approach
Although frameworks such as MINDSPACE provide a basis for developing interventions, they require that the
researcher is at the stage where development can begin. However, there are two stages preceding this, firstly there
is the need for effective – and accurate - identification of insecure behaviours in the workplace, and secondly there
must be adequate identification of the factors driving the behaviours. Without this information, interventions may
target the wrong behaviours or fail to address barriers.
Additionally, following the development of the intervention, there is a final stage that needs to be considered –
evaluation and refinement.
One existing framework, SCENE (Coventry, Briggs, & Jeske, 2014), encompasses the MINDSPACE framework
and addresses many of these issues, i.e., the need for co-creation of nudges, adequate identification of driving
factors, and intervention evaluation. However, SCENE is specific to online nudges, it also does not take into
account normalisation process for evaluation, nor the need to view this process as a reactive ongoing and evolving
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process. The AIDE approach expands upon this and provides a method to aid researchers - and importantly, HC
organisations themselves - through four key stages for implementing effective behaviour change interventions (Fig.
1).
Figure 1. The AIDE Approach
This approach also provides the tools to regularly evaluate and refine the interventions to reflect changes in staff,
team or organisational structure. This is important as security measures within HC need to be dynamic, realistic and
time efficient. Relying upon a singular occurrence of BCT design is inadequate.
3. Piloting the approach
We are piloting this approach as part of a large EU project (Coventry et al., 2020; PANACEA Research). Here we
will detail how we worked through each stage of the AIDE approach up to intervention development, and how we
will evaluate and refine these interventions during the final stage of the project. Our research was approved by
Northumbria University ethics committee.
3.1 Stage 1: Assess
The first stage involves identifying the type of insecure behaviour occurring within the working environment. It is
not possible to design an effective intervention without identifying the key behaviours to target. To achieve this
within our project, we conducted a set of workshops with staff across three different HC organisations, in three
countries (Ireland, Italy and Greece). These workshops included a wide range of staff roles including medical
administrators, IT staff, nurses, doctors, surgeons, residents and laboratory technicians. Staff involvement was
strictly confidential.
Sessions were conducted face-to-face at the hospital location or remotely via Skype. Each session lasted between
45-60 minutes, and included between 2-9 staff members. A total of 50 staff took part across the three sites. For
those interviewees that could not attend the focus groups (e.g., due to patient emergencies), we collected survey-
based responses.
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During the sessions, staff were asked to discuss the type of behaviour they see at work that may represent a
cybersecurity weakness. The facilitators also asked other open-ended questions to prompt discussion, focusing on
the following areas:
Awareness of previous cybersecurity incidents at work
Type of cybersecurity risks that staff felt were of most concern
Type of data and technology that staff interact with on a daily basis and perceived security
General awareness of potential cyber-risk and vulnerability to
By involving end-users we were able to identify a list of insecure behaviours to design interventions relevant to the
sites in question. Workshop transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis, and we identified seven types of
insecure behaviour: Poor computer and user account security; Unsafe e-mail use; Use of USBs and personal
devices; Remote access and home working; Lack of encryption, backups and updates; Use of connected medical
devices; and poor physical security. This stage of the research is reported in full in Coventry et al. (2020).
3.2. Stage 2: Identify
Having identified insecure behaviours occurring in the workplace, the second stage is to identify factors driving
each behaviour. For example is this behaviour driven by a desire to prioritise speed of patient care? Or perhaps due
to a lack of awareness? Without this information interventions are likely to be ineffective (Hedström et al., 2013).
Previous research has identified a range of factors that can drive insecure behaviour, such as perceived self-
efficacy, security attitudes, external influences and threat evaluation (Blythe, 2013). It is also important to
acknowledge that many insecure behaviours have been found to be instrumental, reasoned and conducted as a
means to an end, e.g., to save time (Hedström et al., 2013).
To identify driving factors within our study, we conducted a second phase of workshops with HC staff across the
three sites. Each workshop ran for a total of 3 hours. The sessions included between 15-25 staff members per
group, a total of 56 staff took part across the three HC sites. Again, staff included the same wide range of roles to
ensure that we gained a wide perspective. This time staff were presented with two priority behaviours. These
behaviours were chosen by senior staff members at each location (from the seven behaviours identified in the first
phase), according to those that they felt were most relevant/concerning for their particular working environment.
As HC staff time is limited, this enabled us to explore the most critical security priorities in more depth.
The workshops began with the facilitators providing a short overview from the first workshop. Staff were then
provided with information on the behaviours they would be discussing and informed that the goal of the workshop
was to identify why these behaviours may be occurring. Staff were split into small groups of 3-5 members and
provided with worksheets to help start discussion. The worksheets (Appendix A) were based upon common factors
identified by behavioural theories and accompanying crib sheets were provided (Appendix B). The crib sheets were
translated into the local language of each site to aid staff members who were not fluent English speakers. Following
the group work, everyone was brought back together to for a final overall discussion and summary of key findings.
Thematic analysis of the workshop transcripts identified several facilitators of insecure behaviour: lack of
cybersecurity awareness, time pressure and fatigue, behaviour prioritisation (i.e., staff priority is patient care and
cybersecurity can be seen as a barrier or burden), mutual trust amongst colleagues, lack of reinforcement, and
insecure behaviours necessary to complete their job (Coventry et al., 2020).
We encouraged staff to feel free to share any suggestions they may have regarding how things could be improved.
However, it is interesting to note that staff generally felt disempowered to change things – largely due to feeling
that the insecure behaviour was necessary to do their job. E.g., staff found it difficult to identify interventions to
prevent use of USB devices, as no alternative method was available. Consequently, the only intervention they
suggested was a technological intervention, e.g., using password-protected, encrypted USB devices. Likewise, staff
only identified one potential intervention for encouraging secure sending of patient information, which was a
technological intervention to automatically detect if confidential documents are being attached to an e-mail to
prevent sending. This highlights how, in some situations, technological changes may be more appropriate than
behavioural interventions.
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3.3. Stage 3: Develop
The third stage of the AIDE approach consists of intervention development. Insecure behaviour and facilitating
factors have been identified in the preceding two stages, therefore the researchers can start to identify appropriate
interventions. It is likely that this third phase will provide numerous intervention options, and not all may be
feasible, appropriate or necessary. Examples of the potential interventions identified in our own study are shown in
Table 2. We also identified a range of environmental changes which could be used to facilitate secure behaviour.
E.g., introducing an improved login process to reduce burden on staff due to effort and time spent logging in/out, or
changing the policy so that passwords no longer have to be changed so often (unless password is compromised).




Messages from patients about protecting their lives and keeping their
data private
Incentives
Have a regular award within the company for appropriate behaviour
and/or display a message thanking staff for using the approved, secure
process
Loss framing nudge (disincentive): Alert users that insecure behaviour
could result in loss of their personal files/work/salary information
Pop up message every X mins if the user engages in an insecure
behaviour (disincentive)
Norms
Poster campaign showing senior staff acting securely and/or
supporting secure behaviour
Defaults




“Just because something hasn’t happened yet, doesn’t mean it won’t.
Don’t get complacent! XX% of HC organisations, like this one, have
been affected by some form of cyberattack or data breach” (also
related to Norms).
Risk level: Provide an indication of risk level, this could use visual
aids such as a traffic light system displaying red for high risk, green
for low risk. E.g., in relation to password security or the level of
attacks IT is defending
“Technology alone cannot prevent all cyberattacks/cyber risk. Ensure
you are taking responsibility for your own safety” – and bite- sized
tips on how to achieve
Affect
Highlight potential negative impact on patients if breach/attach
occurs.
Commitment
Display all actions conducted on the staff members computer account
that day & require approval by asking the staff member to tick a box
to say they have reviewed all of these actions and confirm they
conducted or approved these
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Ego Display a message thanking staff for acting securely and therefore
helping to ensure patient safety and data privacy.
The next step that we recommend is the development of a set of criteria to enable the researchers and end-users to
collaboratively identify the final interventions for prototype development. The criteria we used in our study is
presented in Table 3, with each item scored on a scale of 1-5. Criteria may differ according to context.




The feasibility of implementing any hardware or software required for the
intervention. This must take into account the technology already in use




Time and ease of implementing the complete intervention, this includes
design, piloting, integration of any technological components, staff




Any disruption to other work process that could occur as a result of








The degree to which implementing (and running) the intervention is
financially costly for the organisation.
Estimated
effectiveness'
Estimated effectiveness based upon existing literature or previous
experience relating to this behaviour change approach.
Sustainability Long-term sustainability of the intervention within the organisation.
Generalisability Whether the intervention is only suitable for a specific, niche context orwhether it has the potential to be applied in a wider context.
Note: R = Reverse scored 
 
Using the criteria, a team of researchers should independently score each identified nudge. Once completed, the
scores should be tested for interrater reliability using Cohen’s kappa (for 2 raters) or Fleiss’ kappa (for 3+ raters).
Reliability should be >0.80 – a commonly accepted level of strong agreement. If reliability is <0.80, it is
recommended that the researchers meet to discuss the scores causing the discrepancies and work towards mutual
agreement. If agreement is not forthcoming, the criteria may not be well defined and may require amendment until
adequate interrater reliability is achieved.
The overall scores can then be used to narrow down the potential interventions to the final choices (i.e., those
scoring most highly). It is recommended that the selected interventions are then presented to end-users to sense
check and help identify potential barriers to implementation and/or adoption. Final choices for prototype
development will be chosen based upon this end-user feedback. Prototypes should also be co-designed with end-
users, using a feedback loop to refine the prototype, and initial pilot sessions using a representative group of end-
users.
3.4. Stage 4: Evaluate
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Once prototypes have been refined and are ready for the implementation, they will be evaluated within the working
environment. To achieve this, researchers and end-users must work together to explicitly identify measurable
outcomes that can be used as success metrics (or validation indicators). Whenever possible, these metrics should
include an objective technological measure and a baseline measure for comparison, e.g., phishing penetration test
results before and after an anti-phishing intervention is introduced. It is also beneficial to supplement empirical,
technological results with self-reported feedback from the end-users (e.g., via interview or survey). This enables the
researchers to gain more insight into why and how the intervention may be being successful (or not) and may also
highlight potential revisions to improve effectiveness. In some instances, technological measures may be difficult
to obtain and more reliance may be necessary upon self-reported measures.
It is important to note that success metrics will differ significantly depending upon the environment and targeted
behaviour(s) – which further supports the application of customisable approaches such as the AIDE approach. Once
metrics have been identified and measured, this completes the first iteration of the AIDE approach. However, this is
designed to be an ongoing, reiterative and dynamic process (Fig. 1) that evolves with the working environment.
This is particularly important as the HC environment changes regularly including new staff intake, staff rotation,
introduction of new devices, system updates etc.
Without this dynamic approach, interventions may fail to reflect the current cybersecurity position and priorities.
The AIDE approach should be regularly used to re-assess and re- evaluate current behaviour and interventions.
4. Conclusion
To summarise, the AIDE approach introduces a novel framework to structure and guide the application of
behaviour change interventions within the working environment, including within HC. Rather than focusing upon
how to develop a particular intervention (as methodologies already exist for this, e.g., MINDSPACE: Dolan et al.,
2010), this approach provides a framework to structure the entire process from the initial stages of assessing
problematic behaviours and identifying underlying motivations, through to developing an appropriate intervention
(including evaluating suitability and effectiveness), and onto continued reassessment. Although we have
demonstrated this approach in relation to the HC environment – its dynamic process means that it is easily
generalised across many settings.
The AIDE approach encompasses the importance of involving end-users in the process of behaviour change
development. It is possible that with adequate training and support, this approach could also be used to build a
toolkit to enable end-users, such as HC organisations, to apply this process ‘in-house’. This is something that the
PANACEA project aims to deliver.
5. References
Ajzen, I. (1985). From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior. In Action Control.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3_2
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2),
179–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T
Akey, J. E., Rintamaki, L. S., & Kane, T. L. (2013). Health Belief Model deterrents of social support seeking
among people coping with eating disorders. Journal of Affective Disorders, 145(2), 246–252.
Albert, M. (2019). “Why do we need to wait for people to be hurt?” Medical cyber attacks soar 1400%. Retrieved
October 11, 2019, from https://www.sfgate.com/healthredesign/article/medical-cyber-attacks-terrorism-hospital-
health-13853912.php
Blythe, J. M. (2013). Cyber security in the workplace: Understanding and promoting behaviour change.
In Proceedings of CHI 2013 Doctoral Consortium. Retrieved from http://chitaly2013.disi.unitn.it/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/CHItaly_DC_Blythe.pdf
3/1/2021 View of Your hospital needs you: Eliciting positive cybersecurity behaviours from healthcare staff | Annals of Disaster Risk Sciences
https://ojs.vvg.hr/index.php/adrs/article/view/51/39 9/14
Coventry, L., Branley-Bell, D., Magalini, S., Mari, P., Magkanaraki, A., & Kalliopi, A. (2020). Cyber-risk in
healthcare: Exploring facilitators and barriers to secure behaviour. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Coventry, L., & Branley, D. (2018). Cybersecurity in healthcare: A narrative review of trends, threats and ways
forward. Maturitas, 113, 48–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.maturitas.2018.04.008
Coventry, L., Briggs, P., & Jeske, D. (2014). SCENE: A Structured Means for Creating and Evaluating Behavioral
Nudges in a Cyber Security Environment. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07668-3_23
Dolan, P., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., King, D., & Vlaev, I. (2010). MINDSPACE:Influencing behaviour through
public policy. Retrieved from
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/MINDSPACE.pdf
Fishbein, M. (2008). A Reasoned Action Approach to Health Promotion. Medical Decision Making, 28(6), 834–
844. https://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X08326092
Hall, L. H., Johnson, J., Heyhoe, J., Watt, I., Anderson, K., & OʼConnor, D. B. (2017).Exploring the Impact of
Primary Care Physician Burnout and Well-Being on Patient Care. Journal of Patient Safety, 1.
https://doi.org/10.1097/PTS.0000000000000438
Hall, L. H., Johnson, J., Watt, I., Tsipa, A., & O’Connor, D. B. (2016). Healthcare Staff Wellbeing, Burnout, and
Patient Safety: A Systematic Review. PLOS ONE, 11(7), e0159015. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0159015
Hedström, K., Karlsson, F., & Kolkowska, E. (2013). Social action theory for understanding information security
non-compliance in hospitals the importance of user rationale.Information Management and Computer Security.
https://doi.org/10.1108/IMCS-08- 2012-0043
Kam, R. (2015). The human risk factor of a healthcare data breach - Community Blog. Retrieved April 10, 2018,
from https://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/healthitexchange/CommunityBlog/the-human-risk- factor-of-a-
healthcare-data-breach/
Kelly, M. P., & Barker, M. (2016). Why is changing health-related behaviour so difficult?Public Health, 136, 109–
116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2016.03.030
May, C., & Finch, T. (2009). Implementing, Embedding, and Integrating Practices: An Outline of Normalization
Process Theory. Sociology, 43(3), 535–554. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038509103208
Michie, S., Atkins, L., & West, R. (2014). The Behaviour Change Wheel: A Guide to Designing Interventions.
London, UK: Silverback Publishing.
Michie, S., & Johnston, M. (2012, March). Theories and techniques of behaviour change: Developing a cumulative
science of behaviour change. Health Psychology Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2012.654964
Michie, S., Richardson, M., Johnston, M., Abraham, C., Francis, J., Hardeman, W., … Wood, E. (2013). The
behavior change technique taxonomy (v1) of 93 hierarchically clustered techniques: Building an international
consensus for the reporting of behavior change interventions. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 46(1), 81–95.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12160-013-9486-6
National Audit Office. (2018). Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS. Retrieved from
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Investigation-WannaCry-cyber-attack-and-the-NHS-
Summary.pdf
PANACEA Research. (2020). Retrieved January 27, 2020, from https://panacearesearch.eu/ Pfleeger, S. L., &
Caputo, D. D. (2012). Leveraging Behavioral Science to Mitigate Cyber Security Risk. Retrieved from https://ai2-
s2- pdfs.s3.amazonaws.com/e755/aa8baf01ef655ef7b1472ceba505b7c45b91.pdf
3/1/2021 View of Your hospital needs you: Eliciting positive cybersecurity behaviours from healthcare staff | Annals of Disaster Risk Sciences
https://ojs.vvg.hr/index.php/adrs/article/view/51/39 10/14
Rogers, R. W. (1975). A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change. The Journal of
Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.1975.9915803
Rosenstock, I. M. (1974). The Health Belief Model and Preventive Health Behavior. Health Educ Behav, 2(4),
354–386. https://doi.org/10.1177/109019817400200405
Rosenstock, I. M. (1990). The Health Belief Model: Explaining Health Behavior Through Expectancies. Health
Behavior and Health Education: Theory, Research, and Practice.
Scott, M., & Wingfield, N. (2017, May 13). Hacking attack has security experts scrambling to contain fallout. The
New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/world/asia/cyberattacks-online-
security-.html
Service, O., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., Algate, F., Gallagher, R., Nguyen, S., … Kirkman, (2015). EAST Four
simple ways to apply behavioural insights.
Shenoy, A., & Appel, J. M. (2017). Safeguarding confidentiality in electronic health records. Cambridge Quarterly
of Healthcare Ethics, 26(2), 337–341. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180116000931
Sulleyman, A. (2017, February 12). NHS cyber attack: Why stolen medical information is so much more valuable
than financial data | The Independent. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/nhs-cyber-attack-medical-data-records-stolen-why-so-valuable-to-sell-financial-
a7733171.html
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and hapiness. Focus.
Timlett, R. E., & Williams, I. D. (2008). Public participation and recycling performance in England: A comparison
of tools for behaviour change. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 52(4), 622–634.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2007.08.003
Turton, R., Bruidegom, K., Cardi, V., Hirsch, C. R., & Treasure, J. (2015). Novel methods to help develop healthier
eating habits for eating and weight disorders: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews, 61, 132–155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.12.008
van Winssen, K. P. M., van Kleef, R. C., & van de Ven, W. P. M. M. (2016). Potential determinants of deductible
uptake in health insurance: How to increase uptake in The Netherlands? The European Journal of Health
Economics, 17(9), 1059–1072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-015-0745-2
6. Appendix A: End-user Workshop Worksheets
3/1/2021 View of Your hospital needs you: Eliciting positive cybersecurity behaviours from healthcare staff | Annals of Disaster Risk Sciences
https://ojs.vvg.hr/index.php/adrs/article/view/51/39 11/14
3/1/2021 View of Your hospital needs you: Eliciting positive cybersecurity behaviours from healthcare staff | Annals of Disaster Risk Sciences
https://ojs.vvg.hr/index.php/adrs/article/view/51/39 12/14
7. Appendix B: End-user Workshop Crib Sheets
Current Behaviour (Worksheet 1)
ATTITUDE:
Experiential Attitude – How do you feel about the identified risky behaviour? And
how do you feel about acting more securely – do you generally feel positively or
negatively and why?
Do you think acting securely at work is beneficial or a hindrance? Do you have mixed
feelings about this behaviour – if so, can you explain why? How do you think your
feelings affect your behaviour?
Instrumental attitude - What are the costs and benefits of behaving more securely,
in relation to this risky behaviour? Are the benefits generally greater than the costs?
Can you think of any benefits of behaving more securely – for example, do you get
rewarded for this behaviour at work? Would acting more securely help or hinder your
day to day work?
NORMS:
Injunctive Norm - Do your work colleagues ever give you the impression that they
think you should carry out this behaviour?
For example, do they ever expect you – or ask you - to conduct this behaviour?
Descriptive Norm – How do your work colleagues behave at work?
Do you see your work colleagues conducting the identified risky behaviour at work?
PERCEIVED CONTROL:
How much control do you feel you have over this risky behaviour (and acting more
securely) in the workplace?
Do you feel it is within your control to act in a more secure manner, or do you think
there is anything stopping you from doing so?
SELF-EFFICACY, KNOWLEDGE & SKILLS:
Are you confident about your ability to behave in a more secure manner?
Alternatively, if you are not confident, does this drive the identified risky behaviour?
What knowledge and skills do you think are needed to enable you to be able to
behave more securely, in relation to the identified risky behaviour?
What training do you currently receive? Do you think this is sufficient? If not, how
would you improve upon this? Is there anything else outside formal training, that you
feel has (or could) provided you with the knowledge and skills to behave more
securely?
SALIENCE:
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What prompts or reminds you to behave securely at work (in relation to the
identified behaviour)? For example, are there any relevant posters to raise
awareness? Alerts on the workstations or by e- mail?
ENVIRONMENTAL AND/OR TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS:
In what ways does your environment create barriers to secure behaviours? In what
way does your environment and/or the technology you use encourage the identified
risky behaviour?
This could include your working environment, daily responsibilities and/or the
computer systems.
HABIT AND/OR CONVENIENCE:
Do you think the identified risky behaviour has become habitual at work?
For example, do you feel this behaviour is part of the normal working culture
amongst yourself, or other staff members? Or do you think people engage in this
behaviour for convenience?
Behaviour Change (Worksheet 2)
MESSENGER: Who do you think would be the most effective person(s) to communicate
security information at work, in relation to this behaviour? Who would people listen to or
not listen to? Who would people believe?
Are you more likely to listen to information/advice about this behaviour from your
manager or your peers? What about governmental advice?
INCENTIVES: What incentives (or sanctions) might encourage secure behaviour, and/or
discourage the identified risky behaviour?
Do you think rewards (e.g., verbal praise, bonuses, or another form of positive
recognition) would be effective in encouraging secure behaviour? Do you think
punishments (e.g., fines, warnings, or other forms of negative recognition) would be
effective in discouraging unsecure behaviour. Which do you think would work best?
NORMS: How could norms be influenced to encourage more secure behaviour (and/or
discourage the identified risky behaviour)? Whose security behaviour influences other
peoples' security behaviour?
How do you think changing the social norms in the workplace (e.g., how colleagues
are behaving, or how colleagues expect others to behave) could influence this
behaviour in others? Can you think of any ways to do this? Who do you think would
influence others’ behaviour more (e.g., peers, senior staff, IT staff etc)?
DEFAULTS/DESIGN: Where could defaults be used to encourage secure behaviour and
develop secure habits?
What defaults do you think should be offered on workstations to encourage more
secure behaviour and/or discourage the identified risky behaviour? What other
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design changes can you think of to encourage more secure behaviour?
SALIENCE: What things could be introduced to increase your awareness of risk in
relation to this behaviour? What would make people feel that cybersecurity is an important
issue?
Would posters in the workplace help at all? How about alerts via e-mail or on the
computer screens? What else do you think could help raise your awareness of the risk
related to this behaviour?
PRIMING: What might be used to prime or prompt more secure behaviour? What can be
used to keep security in peoples mind?
Can you think of any targeted prompts or security-related questions or alerts that
could help while you are using the workstations? E.g., would it be helpful to have a
reminder about cyberrisk when you log on, or when you perform certain tasks related
to this behaviour? Do you think visual indicators of safety would be helpful?
AFFECT/EGO/EMOTION: Is there any way to use emotion to encourage more secure
behaviour (and/or discourage the identified risky behaviour)? What would make people
feel positive or negative about security behaviours?
Do you think asking staff to reflect upon how they feel about security (or how they
would feel if they were the victim of a cyberattack) would be helpful at all?
How could security be encouraged as something that people feel is important to them and
their self- image? What would make people feel confident in their security behaviours?
What could encourage staff to feel pride in their secure behaviour? For example,
would some kind of award/recognition system be effective? Can you think of any other
suggestions?
COMMITMENT: What kind of commitment/agreement to act securely, might be
helpful?
Would signing a written agreement to behave according to security guidelines
encourage you to act more securely? Can you think of any other steps that staff could
take to indicate – and/or encourage - their commitment to acting securely?
ENVIRONMENT: In what ways could your environment be changed to encourage more
secure behaviours and/or discourage the identified risky behaviour?
Is there anything about your working environment, daily responsibilities and/or the
computer systems at work, which could be changed to make it easier to behave
securely (or conversely more difficult to behave insecurely)?
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